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informativeness, and offers some informal discussion on how a theistic
explanation might rise to the standard of success. Dawes concludes,
if on a number of the criteria we give the theist the benefit of the doubt, we
cannot exclude the bare possibility that there might one day exist a successful theistic explanation. As things stand, for instance, proposed theistic
explanations are not consistent with the rest of our knowledge. (144)

But, again, how so? Are the conclusions of theistic proofs excluded a priori
from “our knowledge”? Do we know that the full range of a posteriori
and a priori arguments for God’s existence fail to yield anything rising to
the level of knowledge? Is non-inferential knowledge of God ruled out
as well? As we’ve already noted, intentional theistic explanations do not
conflict with naturalistic explanations in any obvious way; they do not
conflict any more than explanations in terms of purposes for events conflict with explanations in terms of efficient causes for events. So we are
left with no obvious way in which proposed theistic explanations are supposed to be inconsistent with what we know.
Theism and Explanation is undeniably a well-written and highly accessible
book. Dawes’s approach to theories of explanation in general, and theistic
explanation in particular, makes for easy reading. The tradeoff is that the
details of his account of explanation, theistic and otherwise, lose some clarity and the discussion loses some depth. The tension between naturalistic
and theistic explanations, for instance, is not obvious. And the motivation
for offering a theistic explanation—which might have been found in some
version of the principle of sufficient reason—is obscure. But for readers interested in an introduction to some of these important and complex issues,
Theism and Explanation offers an easy way into the discussion.

Which Trinity? Whose Monotheism? Philosophical and Systematic Theologians
on the Metaphysics of Trinitarian Theology, by Thomas McCall. Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 2010. Pp. 256. $30 (paperback).
DALE TUGGY, SUNY Fredonia
This is a unique, stimulating and yet unsatisfying book which should be
widely read. The answers to the questions in the title, respectively: (1) either a “social” or a constitution theory, (2) Richard Bauckham’s. McCall is
a theologian well versed in analytic philosophy. This book attempts, with
some success, to bridge the cultural, intellectual, and institutional divides
between Christian philosophers and theologians. McCall notes that the
book “will at points be less than satisfying to partisans in both camps” (8).
In chapter 1, he nicely summarizes much recent positive work on Trinity
theories by Christian philosophers, as well as some anti-“social”-theory
arguments. In the next two chapters he sets out to correct the oversights
and misunderstandings of various of these philosophers by endorsing
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Richard Bauckham’s thesis that the earliest Christians “understood [Jesus]
to be included in the identity of the one God” (57). New Testament era
Judaism was “strictly monotheistic,” and yet Christians properly worshiped Jesus. In my view McCall is too confident that the New Testament
supports all these claims. His treatment of the source material (56–72) is
perfunctory, and will be unsatisfying to those familiar with competing interpretations. The last part of chapter 2 gives helpful expositions of what
ancient Arianism and modalism really amounted to (as contrasted with
the ways some philosophers have thrown around those heresy-terms).
In chapter 3 McCall rejects the apparent modalism of Barth and Rahner
(87–89), and returns to the theories of chapter 1. Utilizing the fruits of
chapter 2, McCall rebuts Leftow’s charge that a “social” theory is “Arianism” (95–98). McCall admits that it is unclear how well this “social”
approach coheres with the Western tradition, especially the “Athanasian” creed and theories of divine simplicity (98–103). He rejects relative identity theories because in his view they don’t get us far enough
from modalism and metaphysical antirealism, while he dubs the Rea and
Brower “constitution” theory “promising” (109); in his view it faces no
theological problems, but a few philosophical ones. He rejects Leftow’s
“Latin” theory on the grounds of unclarity, of misfit with the Bible, and
that it likely cannot avoid modalism (111–121). In chapter 3 and later in
the book, McCall defends what most would call a “social” theory; we’ll
return below to this positive thrust.
Chapter 4 sympathetically critiques theologian Robert Jenson’s Trinity
theory, founded on this non sequitur (in Jenson’s words): “since the biblical God can truly be identified by narrative, his hypostatic being, his selfidentity, is constituted in dramatic coherence” (132). Thus, “the one God is
an event; history occurs not only in him but as his being” and “God is the
event of the world’s transformation by Jesus’s love” (ibid.) McCall points
out what is plausibly a confusion about identity underlying Jenson’s project (132–155). Jensonians will want to take a close look at McCall’s friendly
suggestions for amending the theory.
Chapter 5 sympathetically critiques the theological font of much recent
social-trinity theorizing, Jurgen Moltmann. McCall convincingly argues
that Moltmann’s doctrine of “perichoresis” (applied by him both to intraTrinity relations, and to God-world relations) “either does ‘not enough’
or does ‘too much’” (157)—that is, it doesn’t do enough to show how the
three divine persons amount to one god, and it amounts to a God-world
relation that is too close. To help, McCall urges that there are two kinds
of perichoresis—one for inter-Trinity relations, and the other for God-cosmos relations, which he defines (170, 172). This reader was unable to see
how these constitute two species under any shared genus.
Chapter 6 enters the recent debate among evangelical theologians concerning whether or not the Son is eternally “subordinate to” the Father.
This thesis, he argues, is either trivial or inconsistent with the creedal
claim that the two are homoousias (175–180). Further, proponents like
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Grudem and Ware on unclear about which version they really want to
defend (188). In the end McCall pleads that this issue be held separate
from debates about the proper roles of women in church life.
Chapter 7 discusses Orthodox theologian John Zizioulas’s claims that
“nothing in existence is conceivable in itself . . . since even God exists
thanks to an event of communion” (190); “there is no true being without
communion” (191), and “love . . . is constitutive of his [God’s] substance”
(192). McCall discusses these startling claims under the banner “Being as
Communion.” They seem to entail that it is metaphysically impossible
that there be only one thing, and that it is impossible for there to be a self
not in a personal relationship with at least one other self. McCall might
have demanded arguments to back these claims up, discussing prima facie
counterexamples (respectively: God, a lifelong human hermit atheist—
say, Christopher Hitchens raised by wolves).
McCall too is entranced by this picture of God as fundamentally an
eternal, perfect, three-way friendship. Thus he accepts “Being as Communion” but argues that it is in conflict with another thesis to which Zizioulas is committed, what McCall dubs the “Sovereignty-Aseity Conviction.”
This is the claim that God and only God exists a se—independently, or
solely through himself, everything else depending on him. In Zizioulas’s
view, only God—that is, the Father—exists a se, and he is radically free—
not only creation, but even the existence of the Son and Spirit depend on
his free choice. Thus, the Trinity exists contingently, and dependently on
the Father (193, 196).
McCall argues that this ascription of aseity only to the Father amounts
to an objectionable subordinationism. In his view, “Traditional affirmations of subordination have revolved around the ‘function’ of the Son”
(198). He argues that Zizioulas should keep the “Being as Communion”
thesis, as it is “central to the teaching of Scripture and the Christian tradition” (205). But he should ascribe aseity not to the Father alone, but rather
to the Trinity, holding it to be implied by the property divinity (207). Further, the notion of aseity should be clarified—we should re-define it to
mean a lack of dependence on anything which is not divine (209). Thus, both
the Trinity and each of the Persons exist a se. But, preserving the “Being as
Communion” theme, each person depends for his existence on the other
two—existing as a person only because of their relation to another.
What happened to the patristic “generation” and “procession” claims,
which seem to entail that the Son and Spirit both exist because of the
Father? McCall’s response is to redefine the sentence “the Father eternally
generates the Son”:
eternal generation refers us to (a) the incompleteness of the persons as individuals and (b) their complete and irreducible uniqueness in relation to the
other persons. Seen this way, the doctrine of eternal generation emphasizes
that to be a person—even a divine person—is to be incomplete “alone” or in
oneself. (212–213)
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Chapter 8 is McCall’s manifesto for trinitarian theology, some “theses
for scholastic disputation” (219). I highlight just a few: We should think
critically about alleged social and political implications of trinitarian doctrine (225–227). Appeals to mystery cannot atone for doctrines which are
“obviously inconsistent” (228); Trinity doctrines must be “coherent (or at
least not obviously incoherent)” (229) as well as biblically and creedally
kosher. But theologians “need not undertake to show how God is three
and one. Indeed, to attempt to do so reeks of hubris” (232). This seems inconsistent with his friendliness towards any attempt to construct a coherent metaphysical model of the Trinity. Doesn’t a response to the threenessoneness problem entail an answer to the “how” question?
Another important assertion is that “Christian theological commitments
should receive priority . . . if our intuitions about ‘theism’ and ‘monotheism’ conflict with the central elements of Trinitarian doctrine, then so
much the worse for our intuitions about such things!” (233). It is hard to
argue that if something is known to be divine revelation, it may be reasonably believed even if it conflicts with our prior commitments. But exactly
what are these central elements?
McCall nowhere explicitly advances his preferred Trinity theory. But
the outlines are clear enough. “The” Trinity theory, for McCall, involves
three distinct “centers of consciousness and will” (12, 87–89, 236)—what
I would call so many selves—capable of personal relationships with one
another. Their status is absolutely (ontologically) equal, and each depends
for his existence as a self on the others. These, in some sense, are the one,
triune God. This “God” is not a self, though it is “truly personal” (93–94),
and so it has personal properties—or at least, it has parts which do. (Misleadingly, but following other recent social theorists, McCall refers to it
throughout using personal pronouns.) But are not three equally divine
selves three gods? No, for it is only Bauckham’s idea (which McCall agrees
is also the first-century Jewish idea) of monotheism which is relevant and
Bauckham thinks it (this special New Testament era “monotheism,” the
content of which is never spelled out) is consistent with trinitarian developments (233–236), we assume, even “social” ones.
Here most philosophers will balk; Bauckham’s claim cries out for clarification. Is not Jesus portrayed in the New Testament as someone other than
God, someone who prays to and depends on God, who does God’s bidding? On the other hand, isn’t Jesus supposed to be “God incarnate,” God
himself, in human form? Is God who Jesus is? Bauckham often writes as if
God and Jesus are the same self. And yet, Jesus is in his words “included in
the identity” of God, which suggests that they are not. He sometimes suggests that the Father is also so included. Through this cloudy lens, McCall
would have us view the New Testament witness about God and Christ.
But this claim, no less than speculative flights about perichoresis, is in need
of careful analysis and evaluation. McCall himself, not holding God to be
a self, won’t say that God and Jesus are the same self. In what sense, then,
is Jesus “in God’s identity”?
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McCall makes some excellent points about monotheism and the Trinity. It won’t imply monotheism, he says, to say merely that there’s one
generic divine essence, that there’s only one divine “family,” that there’s
only one font of divinity (the Father), or that the Three are united by a
mysterious relation of “periochoresis” (241–242). Amen to all that.
My biggest criticism of the book is its friendliness towards theoretical
solutions, which crucially depend on bold, arguably ad hoc re-definitions.
Yet it is clearly written, sober, insightful, and rich with argument. As intended, it gives theologians and philosophers some important things to
argue about together.

Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, ed. Oliver D.
Crisp and Michael C. Rea. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 316.
$45 (paperback).
PAUL C. ANDERS, Mount Marty College
This is an important and informative collection of essays that I expect will
be highly influential, and which I highly recommend. However, reading
these essays is somewhat frustrating. The frustration centers on a set of
interrelated ambiguities that run throughout the collection. Some of these
ambiguities are unavoidable, but others should be disambiguated and are
not, at least not to the degree one might expect from an analytic treatment
of analytic theology. In what follows, I focus on two concerns: just what
constitutes analytic theology and whether analytic theology is meant to be
only descriptive, or normative as well.
In the introduction, Michael Rea makes two important distinctions.
First, while analytic theology is based on the methods of analytic philosophy, these methods are applied not to natural language analysis as
in early analytic philosophy, but to metaphysical systems or worldviews.
Second, to refer to the methods of analytic philosophy in contemporary
usage is more about a particular style of philosophy with an associated
set of desiderata—clarity, rigor, and logical argumentation being fundamental. As such, analytic theology can allow for much variety with
respect to content and method. Analytic theology may be better thought
of as an attitude toward theological methods as opposed to a way of doing theology.
The first two essays in part one are focused on the nature of analytic
theology, but are less than direct in their conclusions concerning normativity. In “On Analytic Theology,” Thomas Crisp uses a distinction by Peter
Strawson between descriptive and revisionist metaphysics. Descriptive
metaphysics seeks merely to understand the current status of a conceptual
system. Revisionist metaphysics offers an alternative to the current system.
Crisp envisions analytic theology as descriptive partly because it seeks to

